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STUDENT NOTES
NEGOTUAJLE

INSTRUMENTS

LAw-DISTINCTIOiN

BETWEEN

RELEASE

AiqD RENuNcx.ToN.-In the very recent case arising in Kentucky, Gan-

non v. Bronston, 246 Ky. 612 (1933), the appellant sued appellee on
a note executed to him by appellee and appellee's two partners in
business. Appellee In his answer sets up the fact that appellant talked
about the note to him, which covered a debt due the appellant by
the partnership, and said that he, appellant, had come to the conclusion that appellee was causing the financial difficulties in which the
partnershlp was involved, and agreed that if the appellee would surrender his interest in the business and let the other partners run it,
the appellant would release the appellee from all obligation on the
note. The other partners assented to this agreement and appellee
withdrew from the firm. The firm, however, later became bankrupt
and appellant now seeks to hold appellee. The answer of appellee
concludes that he is not liable on the note since the above facts show
a valid release, under K. S. 3720 B-119 (4): "A negotiable instrument
(4) By any other act which will discharge a simIs discharged ...
ple contract for the payment of money." Appellant, in his reply, aWserts that the release is invalid since it was not in writing, as required by K. S. 3720 B-122, which states "The holder may expressly
renounce his rights against any party to the instrument before, at or
after the time of maturity. An absolute and unconditional renunciation of his rights against the principal debtor made at or after the
time of maturity of the instrument will discharge the instrument.
But a renunciation does not affect the rights of the holder in due
course without notice. A renunciation must be in writing, unless
the instrument is delivered up to the person primarily liable thereon."
Held, For appellee. The court said that the transaction was covered by K. S. 3720 B-119 in that it was a release, as distinguished
from a renunciation to which K. S. 3720 B-122 applies.
This case leads us to consider the significance of the terms "release" and "renunciation" in respect to the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is believed that the decision in the above case
is correct, but in view of the fact that the problem is a noval one in
this state, that there Is a conflicting line of authority on the point, and
that this Is aj very important phase of the law of Negotiable Instruments, perhaps it might be well to look into some of the authorities
cited by Commissioner Drury in his able opinion.
It would seem that the view pressed by the appellant that N. I. L%
Sec. 122 applies to all methods of discharge, is the view that first
found favor in this country, and has been the majority rule until
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comparatively recently. Whitcomb v. National Exchange Bank of
Baltimore, 123 Md. 612, 91 At. 689 (1914); Baldwin v. Daly, 41 Wash.
416, 108 Pac. 724-B (1906); Engle v. Brown, (Mo.) 216 S. W. 541
(1919); Pitt v. Little, 58 Wash. 355, 108 Pac. 944 (1910), etc. These
cases support the theory that the N. I. L. Sec. 122 is a sort of Statute
of Frauds to be applied to all forms of release.
The leading case of this group is Whitcomb v. Nat'l Exchange
Bank of Baltimore, supra, which expressly holds that a discharge for
consideration by a holder of a note is invalid unless In writing. The
reasoning of this case resolves itself into the following propositions:
(1) The word "renunciation" may mean surrendering a right or claim
with or without consideration, if the dictionary meaning of the word
is used; and (2) "Sec. 119 is confined to a designation of acts which
discharge the instrument, and does not purport to prescribe the character of proof by which they must be established. Sec. 122 deals
specifically with the subject of discharge by renunciation, and provides in effect that an extinguishment of liability to be thus accomplished must be evidenced in writing, unless the instrument is delivered up to the party primarily liable. The earlier section relates
generally to causes of discharge, while the later section refers In part
to the mode of proof as to a particular method o producing such a
result."
The obvious purpose of the requirement that a renunciation be In
writing is to secure a desirable mode of proof as to one of tbe
methods of discharging a negotiable instrument. Sec. 122 requires
every discharge to be in writing. Now, if the purpose of the rule Is
to secure a satisfactory mode of proof, there is, as a practical matter,
no less reason to require a renunciation for a consideration to be evidenced by a writing, than to require that a gratuitous renunciation
should be so evidenced.
This argument is very logical in its analysis, and leads to this
inevitable conclusion, once the major premise is granted; but it is not
so readily admitted by all that this major premise, that the word
"renunciation" applies to all forms of discharges, releases, etc., Is
true. In fact, the present tendency is to interpret this word as meaning "gratuitous abandonment." This view, as taken by the courts in
recent years, has become so popular that it Is now the majority rule
on the problem: See extensive list of authorities cited in the principal case.
This view is that the term "renunciation" means the giving up of
a right without transferring it to another, gratuitously. The only
conclusion which can be taken by states adhering to this doctrine
is that Sec. 122, dealing with renunciation, applies only to cases involving renunciation: in the strict sense; so a discharge given for a
valid consideration is without the meaning of that section: consequently, such a discharge may be granted orally. As may be seen In
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the opinion, this vieWv, was adopted after intensive study of the history of the N. L L., and the terms used in it.
The historical aspect might be summarized as follows:
"The French law permits discharge of obligation without
consideration. The English courts copied this French rule in
respect to bills and notes, that is, they could be discharged without satisfaction. When the Bills of Exchange Act was adopted
in 1842, the term "renunciation" was used in a technical sense,
and was applied only to a gratuitous waiver of a claim. Though
such renunciation could, previous to the enactment of the Bills
of Exchange Act, be made by parol, it was thought best to modify
the rule, by making it conform to the Scotch law, that is, require
such gratuitous waiver to be shown in writing, unless the note
or bill was delivered up." 4 Tulane Law Review, 119.
No one denies that the N. I. L. should be construed in the light
of the Bills of Exchange Act; Campbell v. Cincinnati Fourth N~at'l
Bank, 137 Ky. 555, 126 S. W. 114 (1910).
In view of these facts, it is difficult to perceive how the word
"renunciation" can be construed in any other but its technical sense,
the interpretation which was placed upon it by the Law Marchant and
the Bills og Exchange Act, of which the N. L L. is largely a codification. Can it be presumed that the learned authors of the N. I. L., and
the legislature of this state waded blindly through the various parts
of the Common Law picking out sections at random, without any
consideration or thought as to their legal import? No! Rather, it is
to be thought that before undertaking the drafting of a law of such!
intricacy and importance as this, the framers would devote a great
deal of time to learning the history of the subject and thd terminology
thereof, so that when courts had occasion to construe the N. I. L. they
might do so legally and according to precedent, and not be put to the
difficulty and embarrassment of placing an unnatural and strained
construction upon the terms in order to reach a result in harmony
with previous decisions.
The N. I. L. deals with a subject highly technical and complex In
its nature, and as such requires highly technical terms to cover the
situations to be met. Likewise, this law was at its inceptions intended
as a Uniform Act to be enacted, in all the states, in order that modern
commercial transactions might not be hindered by petty differences
as to the law of bills and notes in the various jurisdictions. It is'
submitted that the best means of gaining this end, thus accomplishing
the obvious Intent of the framers of the Act, is to place a strict and
definite Interpretation upon the terms, so that there can be no chance
of different interpretations of "loose" phrases in the different courts.
It would seen that to let in oral proof of a gratuitous discharge
would open the door to a vast amount of fraud due to the fact that
anyone could swear that the payee had gratuitously abandoned the
claim. On the other hand, the matter of proof would entail more dif-
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ficulty in the case of a discharge for consideration since a definite
consideration would have to be clearly established; and as Commissioner Drury very aptly states, "We do not deny that an obligor in a
note may be released by parol evidence, but such evidence should be
clear, satisfactory and td the point." Finally, let it be said that th4
result in the principal case is the one most compatable with the Intent
of the drafters of the N. I. L., and the one which In the vast majority
of situations is most just from the point of view of the business man.
In conclusion, it might be said that the most notable thing in the
case is thei learned and thorough way in which it was handled. It Is
believed that this is, perhaps, the most erudite opinion to be found in
the Kentucky Reports. It sets out an exhaustive list of authorities
bearing on the subject, and gives the reader an, opportunity of viewing
the problem from all angles; thus, it does not force one to accept the
conclusion of the judge through lack of information. Rather, it sets
out the different rules adopted by the various courts applicable to this
set of facts, and then by close study and comparison, attempts to
arrive at the most logical solution. An analysis such as this is certainly more conducive to an acceptance of the opinion as a proper
statement of the law than a one-sided opinion in which the opposite
view is not set out or considered at all.
KIK B. MonBELEY.

PLEADING-STATUTE 0P FRAUDS MAY Ba RAISED By DEmusuzn.Deceased and wife, plaintiff, agreed to make mutual wills, each leaving his or her property to the other. This was done but subsequently
deceased made another will leaving his property to his heirs. After
probate of the first will, this second will was produced and the order
probating the first will was set aside and another order entered admitting this second will to probate. The plaintiff then sued to set aside
this second probate, to reinstate the first will and to have the prolerty distributed thereunder. She claimed that this agreement to make
mutual wills gave her a lien upon the property of her husband and
that from the date of execution her husband held the land in trust
for her benefit. Defendants demurred and on hearing of the demurrer it was held that this contract was within the Statute of Frauds and
being oral was unenforceable. Plaintiffs contended that defendants,
if they wished to rely upon the Statute of Frauds, must have pleaded
it affirmatively. He7d: "The question as to whether a contract is
within the Statutes of Frauds may be raised by demurrer." Gibson
v. Crawford, 247 Ky. 228, 56 S. W. (2d) 985 (1932).
The question as to whether the Statute of Frauds may be raised
by demurrer, for ease of discussion, is divided into two groups of factual situations: (1)
where the pleading alleges an oral contract
within the purview of the Statutes of Frauds and alleges no circumstances to take the transaction out of the operation of the statute;

